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Abstract. In the last few years we have witnessed a sustained rise in
the popularity of online Social Network Sites (SNSs) such as Twitter,
Facebook, Myspace, Flickr, LinkedIn, FriendFeed, Google Friend Con-
nect, Yahoo! Groups, etc., which are some of the most visited websites
worldwide. However, since they are are easy to use and the users are
often not aware of the nature of the access of their profiles, they often
reveal information which should be kept away from the public eyes. As
a result, these social sites may originate security related threats for their
members.
This paper highlights the benefits of safe use of SNSs and emphasizes the
most important threats to members of SNSs. Moreover, we will show the
main factors behind these threats. Finally we present policy and technical
recommendations in order to improve security without compromising the
benefits of information sharing through SNSs.
Keywords: Online Social Network, Privacy, Profile squatting, Identity
threat, Image Tagging and Cross-profiling.
1 Introduction
The advent of the Internet has given rise to many forms of online sociality, from
the old e-mail and Usenet services to the more recent instant messaging (IM),
blogging, and online social services. Among these, the technological phenomenon
that has acquired the greatest popularity in this 21st century is the latter, the
Social Networking Sites (SNSs). For the past few years, the number of partic-
ipants of such social networking services has been increasing at an incredible
rate. These Online Social Networks are the network spaces where the individ-
uals are allowed to share their thoughts, ideas and creativity, and also to form
social communities. These online networks provide significant advantages both
to the individuals and in business sectors. Some of the noteworthy benefits of
online social networks are:
– People can stay connected with peers very conveniently, no matter where
they are. The connectedness developed through the social networking might
contribute to increased self-esteem, specially for students [6].
– Like-minded individuals can discover and interact with each other.
– Create a virtual space for new modes of online collaboration, education,
experience-sharing and trust-formation, such as the collection and exchange
of reputation for businesses and individuals.
– In the business sector, an SNS can enhance the company’s collective knowl-
edge and engage a broad range of people in the company in the strategic
planning process.
Since the success of an SNS depends on the number of users it attracts, there
is pressure on SNS providers to encourage design, features and behavior able to
increase the number of members and their connections. However, the security
and the access control mechanisms of SNSs are relatively weak by design since
security and privacy are not considered as the first priority in the development
of SNSs [1]. As a result, along with the benefits, significant security risks have
also emerged in online social networking [17] as well.
The aim of this paper is to provide a useful introduction to security issues in
the area of Social Networking. In this paper, we have examined some of the most
important threats associated with Social Networking Sites and figured out the
primary reasons behind these threats and finally based on that, we have provided
some recommendations for action and best practices to reduce the security risks
to users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the related works in the privacy and security of online social networks. Then
some of the major threats in social network have been elaborated in terms of
vulnerabilities and risks in Section 3. Section 4 represents discussion and several
recommendations for enhancing the privacy and security of SNSs. And finally,
the paper is ended with the conclusion at section 5.
2 Related Works
The popularity of the concept of online social networks has been increasing
since 1997. As a result, in the recent years, social networking has gained intense
media and academic attention. There are academic studies in different fields
such as the ethnographic and sociological approaches to the study of online self-
representation [2, 3, 5].
In addition to that, there have been significant research works on the security
issues of online social networking. An- alyzing the privacy relevant behavior and
privacy risks on popular online sites are of prime concern now. In article [7], the
author has studied online social network users to determine the users’ attitude
towards the Social Networks (SN). The study has revealed the fact that the
users normally tend to reveal a variety of information including their name, age,
gender, address, photos, etc. using their profile and some of them tend to hide,
fabricate such information as well.
The information that is available in the users’ profile can be searched based
upon different criteria and thus can also be accessed by the strangers. Most of
the people tend to expose real identity information; thus it raises privacy and
security issues. Unfortunately many users are not aware of this. The kinds of
information users tend to reveal and corresponding percentage are also studied
in the article [7]:
– Almost half of the participants disclose all elements of their personal infor-
mation.
– More than a quarter of users hide both their age and gender.
– People who hide some of their identity elements have fewer friends.
– Women are more likely to hide their location in comparison to men.
– People who fabricate their identity are less likely to use a fantasy location
and they have the most friends.
A paper by Gross and Acquisty reveals that 71% of the Facebook users have
the tendency to provide large amounts of sensitive personal information such as
image, bithdate, in their profile. This data expose themselves to various kinds of
security risks [11]. In a research on Human Computer Interaction (HCI), Wenday
Mackay has shown that only a minimal percentage of users tend to change the
default and highly permissive privacy preferences [18].
Also a number of new methods and strategies have been proposed in different
research papers to mitigate the risks associated with this information revelation.
In [10], the authors have developed a novel face de-identification algorithm that
can limit the ability of automatic face recognition software by removing iden-
tifying information while presenting other aspects of the face such as gender,
ethnicity and expression. However, such methods have not been deployed to the
social networks yet.
3 Threats of Online Social Networking
The casual posting of personal information on a digital medium might create a
permanent record of the users’ indiscretions and failures of judgments that can
be exploited by the third-parties to produce a number of threats to the users.
The potential threats that the users might face can be broadly categorized in
four groups: Privacy related threats, SNS variants of traditional network and
information security threats, Identity related threats and Social threats. In the
following subsections we will discuss these threats.
3.1 Privacy Related Threats
Digital File of Personal Information
Vulnerabilities:With the advancement of data mining technologies and the re-
duction of cost of disk storage, third parties can create a digital file of personal
data from the information revealed on the profiles of SNSs. A common vulner-
ability is that more private attributes, which are directly accessible by profile
browsing, can be accessed via search (e.g. a person’s name and profile image is
accessible via search on MySpace, Facebook and others, unless default privacy
settings are changed).
Risk: The information revealed on an SNS can be exploited by an attacker to
embarrass, to blackmail, to impersonate or even to damage the image of profile
holder. For instance, people can miss out employment opportunities since the
employer reviews the SNS profiles of the prospective candidates [8, 9]. Another
example is Facebook Beacon, a marketing initiative that allows websites to pub-
lish a user’s activities to their Facebook profile as “Social Ads” and promote
products. When launching Beacon, Facebook stated “no personally identifiable
information is shared with an advertiser in creating a Social Ad”, and that
“Facebook users will only see Social Ads to the extent their friends are sharing
information with them”.
Sadly data mining is still possible, the BBC “Click” technology program
demonstrated that personal details of Facebook users and their friends could be
stolen by submitting malicious applications.
Face Recognition
Vulnerabilities: Users of a social network often tend to add images to their
individual profiles that can be used for identifying the corresponding profile
holders. Thus an stranger can use this data source to correlate profiles across
services using face recognition, which is a part of the broader threat posed by
so-called mashups.
Risk: Face recognition can be used for the linking of image instances (and the
accompanying information) across services and websites which in turn enables
connecting, for example, a pseudo-anonymous dating profile with an identified
corporate website profile. As a result, an attacker can gather substantially more
information about a user than intended.
Content Based Image Retrieval
Vulnerabilities: Most of the SNSs haven’t employed any privacy controls over
the images of the profiles to prevent the disclosure of information through the
Content Based Image Retrieval (CBIR) yet. CBIR is an emerging technology
which is able to match features, such as identifying aspects of a room (e.g. a
painting) in very large databases of images and thus increases the possibilities
of location the users [4][14][16].
Risk: CBIR opens up the possibility of deducing location data from ap-
parently anonymous profiles containing images of users’ homes. This can lead
to stalking, unwanted marketing, blackmailing and all other threats associated
with unwanted disclosure of location data.
Image Tagging and Cross-profiling
Vulnerabilities: The SNS user has the option to tag images with metadata
such as the name of the person in the photo, a link to their SNS profile (even if
they are not the owner/controller of that profile), or even their e-mail address.
Risk: An attacker can use this feature to slander some well-known person-
alities or brands and gain profit from their reputation. This information can be
used to reveal links to relatives, friends, partners, co-workers, potentially leading
to kidnappings.
Difficulty of Complete Account Deletion
Vulnerabilities: Members of SNS normally face more difficulty in deleting the
secondary information than to delete their user accounts. In some cases, such
secondary information is almost impossible to remove. For instance, the public
comments a user has made on other accounts using their identity will remain
online even after deleting his account.
Risk: The user may lose the control over his/her personal information. The
information that can’t be removed can be used as a digital personal file. For
example, in 2008 Facebook allowed account to be deleted by the user, previously
account “deactivation” was the only (partial and incomplete) solution.
3.2 SNS Variants of Traditional Network and Information Security
Threats
Spamming
Vulnerabilities: The enormous growth of social networking sites has encour-
aged the spammers to create the unsolicited and masive messages (spam) in
order to produce traffic to their sites and better ranks at search engines, and at
the same time overloading the social networks.
Risk: This spam may cause traffic overload, loss of trust or difficulty in
using the underlying application as well as phishing and detours to inappropriate
sites. In May 2009, Facebook users all over the world suffered a massive phishing
campaign, launched by Russian hackers from servers in Latvia and China, that
led to thousands of accounts being hijacked.
Cross Site Scripting, Viruses and Worms
Vulnerabilities: SNSs are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks and
threats due to widgets produced by weakly verified third parties [12]. Every
big SNS offer a well documented and easy API to programmers (in order to
attract more users with new features), but they don’t ensure security on the
code produced.
Risk: An attacker can use this vulnerability to compromise the account, to
perform phishing attack and to spread the unsolicited content to the email and
Instant Messaging (IM) traffic. Moreover, it can also be used for Denial of service
and associated loss of reputation.
SNS Aggregators
Vulnerabilities: Some of the new applications such as Snag, SocialMediaPop,
NameBeeNameBee, ProfileLinker, TwitterFeed, etc. provide read/write access
to several SNS accounts to integrate the data into a single web application. But
such applications use weak authentication method and thus the vulnerability is
increased.
Risk: The effects of this vulnerability are identity theft, zombification of SNS
accounts, e.g. for XSS attacks or advertising, loss of privacy for other members
of the SNS by allowing search across a broader data base.
3.3 Identity Related Threates
Phishing
Vulnerabilities: A phisher can easily and effectively exploit the information
available on social networks to increase the success rate of a phishing attack.
For instance, the email phishing attacks can achieve 72% hit rate by using the
information available in the social network [13]. SNSs are also vulnerable to social
engineering techniques, which exploit low entry thresholds to trust networks and
to scripting attacks, which allow the automated injection of phishing links.
Risk: Phishing can reveal sensitive information, such as passwords and credit-
card or bank account numbers and it can cause financial and reputation damage.
Information Leakage
Vulnerabilities: The privacy of online social networks is jeopardized since an
attacker can easily become a friend of a member of any restricted group by
dissembling his identity and then access to the private information that belongs
to the members of only that group. Moreover, on many SNSs such as MySpace
and Twitter, it is even possible to use scripts to invite friends (MySpace) or to
follow members (Twitter).
Risks: Some of the potential risks associated with this threat are: leakage
of private information, phishing for information and conducting spamming and
marketing campaigns.
Profile squatting through Identity theft
Vulnerabilities: A malicious attacker can create a fake profile to impersonate
a renowned person or a brand, e.g. users impersonating celebrities on Twitter.
Such profiles are usually created by the people who know the personal details
of a user and create a profile to impersonate him or her and thereby causing all
sorts of problems for the victim.
Risks: Profile squatting can done a significant damage to the reputation of
a person or any brand which may in turn lead to financial and social problems.
3.4 Social Threats
Stalking
Vulnerabilities: A participant can reveal his personal information including
location, schedule, home address, phone number, real time location using a GPS,
etc. in his profile, which can be used by an attacker for social stalking to threat
the victim through physical proximity or phone calls or even e-mails, instant
messengers or messaging on SNSs. Stalking using SNSs is increasing currently.
Risk: The impact of cyber stalking on the victim is well known and can
range from mild intimidation and loss of privacy to serious physical harm and
psychological damage. For example, Twitter encourages members to post their
mobile phone numbers in their profiles in order to “increase fun”.
Corporate Espionage
Vulnerabilities: Social engineering attacks using SNSs are a growing but often
underrated risk to corporate IT infrastructure.
Risk: The main risk here is the loss of corporate intellectual property, but
gaining access to insiders may also be a component in a broad range of other
crimes, such as hacking corporate networks to cause damage, blackmailing of
employees to reveal sensitive customer information and even to access physical
assets.
4 Discussion and Recommendation
By analyzing the different kinds of threats associated with the Social Network
Sites, we have found the following major factors that might be considered as the
root of all the above threats:
– Most of the users (especially teenagers) are not concerned with the impor-
tance of personal information disclosure and thus they are in the risk of
over-disclosure and privacy invasions due to this underestimation of extent
and activity of their social network. Main threats are related to the friends
list, posted pictures, wallposts, etc., where users are relatively less conscious
to compare to the personal profile information.
– Users who are aware of the threats, often fail to properly manage their
privacy preferences due to the complexity and ambiguity of the interface
and lack of user friendly guidelines that would help the users to choose the
appropriate privacy settings.
– The existing legislation and policy are not equipped to deal with many of
the challenges that the social network currently presents including the legal
position on image-tagging by third parties, the legal position on profile-
squatting, etc. Even slanderous allegations using digital media is unclear in
most countries.
– Lack of appropriate authentication and access control mechanisms as well as
other security related tools to handle different privacy and security issues of
online social networks.
Also there are privacy problems originated at the social networks itself. For
example, in July 2009 it came to light that there are concerns by the Cana-
dian Privacy Commission that Facebook is breaching several Canadian privacy
laws by not deleting a user’s information when their account is deactivated and
by giving “confusing or incomplete” information to members. Facebook’s Chief
Privacy Officer was quoted as saying that “[Facebook] was working with the
commission to resolve the issues”. The CPC have given Facebook 30 days before
they make a further review and recommendations. If Facebook don’t comply
with the Canadian statutes it’s possible that the issue could be taken to the
federal courts.
Privacy proponents have criticized Facebook’s privacy agreement, which states:
“We may use information about you that we collect from other sources, includ-
ing but not limited to newspapers and Internet sources such as blogs, instant
messaging services, Facebook Platform developers and other users of Facebook,
to supplement your profile”. Another clause that received criticism concerned
Facebook’s right to sell a user’s data to private companies, stating: “We may
share your information with third parties, including responsible companies with
which we have a relationship”.
The massive phishing campaign mentioned above originated strong criticism
against Facebook for its late reaction to this issue and the fact that initially it
merely tried to block the attack, rather than notifying users of the situation.
Other security fears regarding profile content itself are also present. For ex-
ample in MySpace the embedding of videos inherently allows all of the format’s
abilities and functions to be used on a page. A prime example of this surfaced
in December 2006, when embedded QuickTime videos were shown to contain
hyperlinks to JavaScript files, which would be run simply by a user visiting a
’phished’ profile page, or even in some cases by simply viewing a user’s ’about
me’ elsewhere on the site. Users who entered their login information into a fake
login bar that appeared would also become ’phished’, and their account would
be used to spam other members, thus spreading this security problem.
On January 26, 2008, over 567,000 private MySpace user pictures were down-
loaded from the site by using a bug published on YouTube and put on the
Piratebay torrent site for download.
MySpace is often used as a venue for publicizing parties, sometimes with the
host’s knowledge and sometimes without. There have been some well-publicized
incidents where MySpace parties have caused thousands of dollars damage to
property.
4.1 Recommendations
Some of the recommended strategies for minimizing the threats associated with
online social networks are described below:
Building self awareness about information disclosure: Users need to
be more conscious about the information they reveal through their personal pro-
files in online social networks. They also have to accurately maintain their profiles
through periodical review and necessary modification of the profile contents to
ensure appropriate disclosure of information.
Encouraging awareness-raising and Educational Campaigns: Gov-
ernment should initiate different educational and awareness-raising campaigns
to inform the users how to make rational usage of Social Networking Sites as
well as to encourage the providers to develop and practice security conscious
corporate policies.
Reviewing and reinterpreting the regulatory framework: The exist-
ing legislation may need to be modified or extended (not addressed by the current
law) due to the introduction of some issues like the legal position of image tag-
ging by third persons, etc. As a result, the regulatory framework governing SNSs
should be reviewed and revisted.
Promoting stronger authentication and access-control where ap-
propriate: The strength of authentication method varies from an SNS to an-
other. However, in order to avoid fake and troublesome memberships, the au-
thentication mechanism need to be further strengthen using additional authen-
tication factors, such as e-mail verification through CAPTCHAS.
Setting appropriate defaults: Since most of the users are not aware of
the necessity for changing the default privacy preference [19], it is essential to
set the default setting as safe as possible. The SNS service provider also needs to
offer user friendly guidelines that help the users to change the privacy settings
successfully.
Providing suitable security tools: Providers also need to offer the fol-
lowing strategies for better user control on different privacy and security related
issues:
– Tools that will allow the users to remove their accounts as well as edit their
own posts on the other people’s public notes or comment areas conveniently.
– Automated filtering tools for determining the legitimate contents.
– Tools for controlling the tagging of images depicting them.
– New privacy software such as visualization tools for increasing the utiliza-
tion of privacy options by providing clear representations of social networks,
friend proximity, and availability of profile features.
5 Conclusion
Online social networks offer exciting new opportunities for interaction and com-
munication, but also raise new privacy and security concerns. In this paper we
have briefiy described some of the major features and benefits of social network-
ing that have made this technology one of the most popular Internet technolo-
gies of today. We have also highlighted the crucial privacy and security threats
that may arise due to “almost-anything-goes” ethics of social networking sites.
Finally, we have stated some recommendations to enhance the security issues
of SNSs’ to ensure that the users will get benefits from the social network sites
rather than suffering its downsides. Insecure online social networks can make the
perfect hearquarters for spammers, unscrupulous marketers, etc., people able to
do serious harm to the uninformed users.
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